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COURT COSTSAWARD TO PARTY SUBSTANTIALLY PREVAILING
One of the most troublesome and sometimes most expensive
items of any litigation is the court costs. This may well be accounted for by the fact that the allowance of costs depends entirely
upon statute as no costs were allowed at common law.! The statutes of Virginia make different provision for costs in the trial and
in the appellate courts. In the trial court, costs are awarded to
"the party for whom final judgment is given."2 A court of equity
always retains discretion over the subject of costs.3 However in
the Supreme Court of Appeals, costs are recovered "by the party
substantially prevailing."4
Court costs are of greatly added importance in annexation proceedings due to the expense of obtaining evaluating commissioners,
a special three judge court and usually prolonged litigation. As a
result, special statutes as to court costs apply in such cases. When
the city asks for annexation, all costs in the lower court are to be
paid by the city.s Costs in the appellate court are again to be
awarded to the party substantially prevailing.6 Prior to 1946, in
cities over 150,000, costs in the annexation court were left to the
discretion of that court.7
Two real estate improvement companies had developed certain
lands just beyond the city limits of Richmond by installing gas,
water and sewer facilities. The city annexed this territory and
became bound by statutes to pay the fair value of these improvements.
Failing to come to an agreement with the City, the land companies
filed a petition in the annexation court and were given judgment.
The burden of paying the annexation court costs was placed on the
city. The annexation court relied on a now repealed statute permitting discretion in awarding of costs.9 On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Appeals greatly modified the judgment against the city
and awarded appellate costs to the city in that they were the "substantially prevailing" party in the appellate court. On rehearing,
held, the award of appellate costs does not relieve the city from
payment of lower court costs as the land companies received a modified but final judgment in the lower court. Richmond v. 'County
of Henrico, 185 Va. 859, 41 S. E. 2d 35 (1947).
The city was already bound to pay the fair value of the improvements annexed. The issue, therefore, in the trial court was
as to amount as distinguished from liability. As the appellate court
remanded with directions for a substantial reduction of the judgment,
a question arises as to whom final judgment, in the prevailing sense,

was awarded. With the city bound to- pay some amount, it is
submitted that when it gets a substantial reduction from the demands
of the land owner, it has won its case. Otherwise, in light of the
statute, final judgment could never be entered for the city and it
must be forced to bear the court costs for each non-concurring land
owner.
Appellate costs however are separate and distinct and are to be
awarded to the party "substantially prevailing" in the appellate
court.1ro What is meant by substantially prevailing has frequently
,been decided in accordance with the essence and right of the case,
upon its disposal by the appellate court, independent of the technical
right of either party to an affirmance or a reversal.,,
Where plaintiff sued for and recovered $450.00 in the lower
court and the appellate court directed the maximum recovery to be
$300.00 and awarded a new trial, it was held that appellant had
"substantially prevailed" in the appellate court.12
The "prevailing party" is the party in whose favor the decision
or verdict in the case is or should be entered, and in determining
this question, the general result should be considered and inquiry
made as to who has, in the view of the law, succeeded in the action.13
Appeal costs will be awarded to the appellant where a decree
is reversed in part. Under such circumstances, the appeal is necessary to obtain relief from error in the decree and the appellant is
therefore regarded as the party substantially prevailing.'4 Genlerally, an appellant who succeeds in reducing the amount of recovery
is entitled to the costs of appeal providing the reduction is substantial.'5
From the peculiar facts of the instant case, and the corresponding difficulty in applying the provisions of the lower court costs, it
appears the annexation court might have, at most, apportioned the
costs.' 6 Where the imposition of costs is left to the lower court's
discretion, it will not be overturned except by a palpable abuse of
discretion.17 As said by Lord Mansfield,'8 "Discretions must be
governed by rule; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but
legal and regular." In the instant case, the amount awarded by
the trial court was reduced by approximately $75,000.00 It is difficult to visualize a situation in which there would be a more palpable abuse of discretion.
HENRY D. KASHOUTY
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